

Road Casualties in the City of London

Local Implementation Plan - City road safety objectives and how they are being met

Against a background of nearly static numbers of city workers and declining traffic levels the City has failed to meet a succession of road casualty reduction targets

Now, in its Local Implementation Plan (LIP) the City has set very demanding targets to reduce road casualties. This report examines the LIP and compares its targets to forecasted levels of casualties.

The size of the reduction should not be underestimated; it is equivalent to eliminating every single casualty at all of the nine casualty hot spots identified in this report.

The capital expenditure programme of the Streets and Walkways subcommittee has been dominated by street scene projects that have a marginal, if an, impact on road safety.

It is clear that this target will not be achieved by engineering solutions alone. City-wide initiatives like, large scale pedestrianisation, closing some streets to traffic during the morning rush hour, reduced speed limits and restructuring delivery strategies will be required.

Better coordination is needed between the two committees responsible for reducing road casualties in the City; the Streets and Walkways sub Committee (S&W) and the Police Committee. Coordination between these committees is poor. At the time the LIP and its challenging targets were adopted by S&W, the Police committee had effectively set its target as containing casualties at just below their current level.

Other areas very similar to the City have seen road casualties fall. It may be possible to learn from these neighbours and the Metropolitan Police some explanations for their success.

It seems unlikely that that the targets in the LIP will be attained unless a senior member takes responsibility for their implementation.

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The challenge


Between 2003 and 2010 employment in the City rose by less than 5%; overall traffic volumes fell by 14%, and pedestrian casualties rose by nearly 50%. Casualties of occupants of motor vehicles fell in this period by 25%.

Against this background, in January 2012, the City published its Local Implementation Plan (LIP), with a set of measurable targets, arguably the most important relating to the reduction of road casualties.

2013 target


The headline target is to reduce total road casualties by 12.5% of the average 2004-2008 level by 2013 and by a further 17.5% by 2020. This target is set against a trend of rising not falling road casualties. In 2003 there were 328 road casualties on City streets. By 2011 the number of casualties had risen to 419.

Chart 1 shows the 2013 target of 322 or fewer casualties (in green) against actual road casualties between 2003 and 2011. The rising trend marked in purple suggests that if nothing different is done that there will be over 400 casualties in 2013. There is only twenty months to go and reducing this level to below 325 casualties is already looking a considerable challenge.




2020 target

Chart 2 shows the overall LIP target to 2020. This is equally challenging; it calls for casualty rates to be at or below 258 - a reduction of 40% of the 2004-2008 level or a near halving of the projected 2020 level, if casualties continue to grow at the current trend rate. Achieving this target will involve a reduction of around 9% per annum every year from now until 2020.




Feasibility of the targets

Chart 3 shows the reduction in pedestrian casualties which have occurred in “Central” Westminster, which suggest that the City’s reduction targets are feasible. Over the period 2003 to 2010 pedestrian casualties fell at an annual rate of around 9%. Previous comparisons with Westminster have been challenged on the basis that large parts of Westminster have street and traffic characteristics that are very different to those found in the City. Accordingly, a small high density sector of Westminster has been used for comparison. This sector, “Central” Westminster is a rectangle of about one square mile extending from Tottenham Court Road tube station in the North East to the top of Sloane Street in the South West, including many busy roads and intersections and the complex street patterns of Soho and Mayfair. It is shown as a map in Appendix 2.



The City’s road casualty record

Chart 4 shows that during the 7 years 2003 to 2010 cyclist casualties doubled. Pedestrian casualties are more difficult to gauge. Using 2003 as a base suggests levels rose by nearly a half; using other years a plateau or even a decline. However overall there is a statistically significant upward trend. During the same period casualties to occupants of motor vehicles fell by a quarter. This disparity between vulnerable and non-vulnerable road users underlines LIP objective 2011.3 *to reduce road traffic dangers and casualtiesamong vulnerable road users.*




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When, where and how

When


Casualties are concentrated in the morning rush hour. Chart 5 shows the distribution of all road casualties over the course of the day, contrasting 2000 and 2010. It is interesting to observe that the morning peak is now more pronounced (25% of casualties in



2010 occurred between 07:00 and 11:00). The evening peak has virtually disappeared (in 2000 over a quarter of casualties occurred between 14:00 and 17:00; in 2010 the figure was less than 19%). The lunch time blip has also gone. Examination of the distribution of crashes over days of the week (not shown) produces no surprises, with the average weekday generating roughly three times as many crashes as the average weekend day.

Where

Road casualty hotspots in the City are well documented and the following map, which plots the density of casualties will confirm.




Map 1

Plots the density of casualties between 2000 and 2010 on a 50 metre square grid. So on the junction of Fleet Street and Farringdon Street there were between 80 and 100 casualties in a 50 metre square grid between 2000 and 2010

Map 1 identifies nine major casualty hot spots in the City. The number of casualties between 2000 and 2010, at each location is shown in the table below. These nine hotspots account for one third of the total casualties in the City over the ten year period.


	Total	Pedestrians %	Cyclists %	Other %
King William St/London Bridge	237	22	24	54
Bank	192	45	27	29
Bishopsgate/Liverpool St	173	46	20	34
Fleet St/Farringdon St	157	28	34	38
Moorgate/London Wall	147	29	21	50
Holborn Circus	137	16	24	60
Farringdon St/Holborn	118	19	27	53
Blackfriars Underpass	115	3	14	83
Moorgate/Ropemaker St	96	30	30	40
Total	1372	28	24	48

The table clearly shows that Bank and Bishopsgate/Liverpool Street are particularly dangerous for pedestrians who made up over 45% of total casualties at these locations. Chart 6 shows the history of casualties within 50 metres of these nine hot spots. Apart from a marked drop in non-vulnerable casualties between 2001 and 2006 there has not been much change in casualty levels, overall, at these locations.



Neither is examination of the history of casualties at individual hot spots very fruitful

Chart 7 shows a typical historical analysis of casualties, this one at the Fleet




Street/Farringdon Street junction, where there seems to be little discernable pattern or trend. Only at the Blackfriars Underpass (Chart 8) is some pattern discernable; here there is some evidence of a drop in casualties in the “other” category (occupants of motor vehicles).

Examination of the exact location of the occurrence of casualties may be useful. Appendix 1 shows the location of pedestrian casualties near the Bishopsgate and Liverpool Street junction. It is surprising to note here that one of the biggest concentrations of pedestrian casualties seems to be exactly at the location of the underpass to Liverpool Street station.

How

Are road works responsible?

The increased incidence of road works in the City has been cited as




a potential explanation for additional crashes, and indeed examination of the data suggests that this is the case. Chart 9 shows all the crashes in the City in which road works were cited as a contributory factor; there is a clear trend here.

Are motor vehicle manoeuvres a factor.

Examination of the manoeuvres of vehicles involved in crashes produces no significant trends except for vehicles that were stopping or slowing at the time of the crash, which is shown in Chart 10

This is significant; the number of casualties related to crashes where vehicles involved were stopping or slowing at the time of the crash has risen from 6 in 2000 to 36 in 2010.




What is the City doing about road casualties?

Capital Expenditure

Capital expenditure, which might improve road safety in the City is almost always initiated and approved the City's Streets and Walkways Sub-committee (S&W). It was formed in May 2004 and replaced the Traffic Management and Road Safety Sub-Committee.

The expenditure approved by S&W between that date and the end of 2010 has been allocated into the following areas shown in the table and presented as Chart 11

Application	£million	%
Highway	4.6	14.7
Other	2.3	7.5
Planters	1.0	3.4
Riverside	3.2	10.3
StreetScene	20.0	64.2
Total	31.2	100.0



The dominance of Street Scene expenditure over the period is marked. It would be interesting to know if any other Local Authority has such a bias. It is remarkable that there has been no summary of

the type presented in Chart 11 requested by the S&W, which suggest an absence of any overall strategy.



Policing

The City of London Police have had a variety of casualty reduction targets, which they translate into operational “procedures.”

Operation Atrium is aimed at targeting bad cyclist behaviour, and numerical targets are set for apprehending cyclists and inviting them to attend retraining and awareness schemes. The intention is presumably to enhance the safety of pedestrians and cyclists.

In the period 2000 to 2010 there were 457 pedestrian casualties at automatic traffic signals and only 6% of these were as a result of an interaction with a cyclist. Chart 12 shows that there are probably more fruitful targets, if the objective of this strategy is to protect pedestrians at traffic lights.

If the objective is to improve the safety of cyclists at lights then Chart 13, which shows the number of cyclists injured at traffic lights over the last 11 years, suggests that this policy has failed. The number of cyclists injured at traffic lights has doubled during the time that operation Atrium has been in force.



The City of London Police Committee

In addition to the Streets and Walkways sub-committee, the City’s Police Committee has an interest in road safety and indeed sets its own targets for road casualty reductions. Unfortunately these seem to bear no relation to the LIP targets and have had a curious evolution.


The target set in the Policing Plan for 2010 to 2013 was that the City should be in the second quartile for people killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions per 100 million vehicle kms travelled. To even the most hardened

road safety campaigner this is an unrealistically demanding target; in 2010 the City was the worst performing local authority in the country on this measure; moving into the second quartile would require a reduction of 75% on this measure.

The current Plan for 2012 to 2015 has now swung to the opposite extreme. The current target is now simply to achieve fewer than 413 collisions, which is reported to be the current level of collisions. There are two issues with this target. First the reported level of collisions is at variance with the level reported by S&W and TfL; this may arise from confusion between collisions and casualties. Second, whatever the base level this target effectively abandons any attempts to reduce collisions; it opts instead to hold them at their current level.

The Police committee operate the Special Interest Area Scheme, through which Members take the lead in different areas, allowing particular focus on important issues. It is interesting to note that Road Safety is not one of the 13 special interests of the members of the committee, despite it being one of the five priorities in Policing Plan 2012 - 2015.

Appendix1 pedestrian casualties at Bishopsgate/Liverpool St



Appendix 2 Central Westminster

